Three tiers theory — source notes

Sources: - Kagi share: https://assistant.kagi.com/share/7ea835d0-8a0d-4a06-ba25-72502921245a - Kimi share: https://www.kimi.com/share/19fc776d-d1a2-8aa1-8000-0000c4edee6d - Original Kagi chat (login-walled): https://assistant.kagi.com/chat/b0955036-9d0b-465f-a598-3e6b00d50432

Provenance tags: [U] = your own line in the conversation, [A] = AI’s elaboration (built on your claims), [U/A] = joint. Everything below is raw material, not article prose.

0. The thesis

当AI和自动化让“人多”不再是筹码，弱者在分配桌上的份量就在流失。这是比失业更深的那个变化。 When AI and automation stop making “sheer numbers” a bargaining chip, the weak’s weight at the distribution table drains away. That is a deeper change than unemployment.

Distinction that makes it “deeper than unemployment”: - Unemployment is about income — you matter enough to be compensated. - The drain is about standing/bargaining position — the negotiation itself ends. - [A] “到那个阶段，不是因为钱够了，是因为不稳了。” (Compensation arrives when the table wobbles, not when the money exists.)

1. The three tiers (Kagi conversation)

[U] Original claim:

我觉得未来是一部分人的共产主义，一部分人的商业投机，剩下的人就被做家长的看着

The three tiers = three political-economic principles as modes of living, not property classes:

• [U] “它们分别是共产主义，资本主义和社会主义。有的人可能过着两种生活：边工作边做开源。这种分别和财富无关。”
• [A] Classification standard = how you participate, not what you own. “你的分类标准不是拥有什么，而是你如何参与社会” (communing / exchanging / being administered).
• [A] “主体性先于经济地位。不是’你有多少钱决定了你的阶级’，而是’你如何度过时间、如何协作、如何被治理，决定了你是什么政治经济动物’。” — subjectivity precedes economic position. Examples: a rich VC can live tier-1 (funding open source, DAOs); a poor assembly-line worker lives purely tier-3; a white-collar worker cycles through all three in one week.
• [A] Key: “这种结构的关键不在于’谁拥有生产资料’，而在于谁拥有逃逸的权利。” — the crux is not ownership of the means of production but the right to escape.
• [A] The three tiers sit as concentric circles: 圆心=共产主义(共享基础设施), 中环=投机(在平台上博弈), 外环=被管理(平台用户).

Double life & the parasite chain

[A] Day/night/rest split:

白天：写商业代码 → 雇佣劳动 → 资本主义逻辑
晚上：提交 PR   → 自愿协作 → 共产主义逻辑
休息时：刷信息流 → 被投喂   → 社会主义逻辑

• “双重生活不是病态，是系统性的稳定器”
• 共产主义为资本主义输血: global internet runs on open source, platforms extract rent from the free commons. “你的’双重生活’客观上是在用共产主义劳动为资本主义加固地基。”
• 资本主义为共产主义提供避难所: a day job funds the evenings’ open source.
• 社会主义是润滑层: frictionless consumption so the other two logics run smoothly.

Parasite chain (your observation, AI sharpened):

第一类人制造“共有” → 第二类人封装成平台 → 第三类人在上面“社交” → 实际上被治理

• [U] “聊天和聚集的平台恰恰是第一类人造的”
• [A] “结构性善意劫持”: tier-1’s gift (open source/protocols) is appropriated by tier-2 platforms; tier-3’s need (gathering) is converted into governance data. “最终第一类的共产主义理想，喂养了第三类的社会主义牢笼。”
• [A] “共产主义的’善意’变成了治理的’基础设施’”: openness → computability; decentralization → tracability; free tools → everyone inside the same grammar.

The 4-tier extension (from the AI’s first reply — the “shadow layers”)

[A] Your 3 categories miss shadow layers that fit nowhere: - 系统的维护者 (data labelers, moderators, couriers, robot maintainers) — neither speculators nor “watched”: “他们不被’照顾’，而是被使用” - 离线者/废弃人口 — not watched, moved out of frame - 主权套利者 (cross-border regulatory arbitrage) — play the law itself

2. The two exits: 躺平 and 废弃人口

[U] “有躺平的，也有废弃人口。中国在致力解决废弃人口。” [U] “我是把这个分类当成未来人口的生活方式” (the tiers are a lifestyle catalogue, a prediction of how people will live)

躺平 (lying flat)

• = active refusal of exchange, but still on the governance floor. Still consumes, still produces data, still in the algorithmic frame.
• [A] “不是废品，而是让机器空转的人” — not waste, but someone who makes the machine spin idle.
• [A] “对治理的降级攻击——你不是推翻系统，而是让系统被迫用更昂贵的手段来管理你。” A degradation attack: refuse data (algorithms lose their target) and refuse the door (neighbors fail), so governance must fall back to its most expensive tool — a human knocking on a door.
• 躺平 vs 废弃人口 (AI’s table): - 躺平: system knows you exist; you’re at tier-3’s bottom; friction with the system IS your resistance. - 废弃: system doesn’t know where you are, or can’t process you; outside all layers; no friction at all.

废弃人口 (waste/surplus population)

• [A] Theoretical lineage: Marx’s 相对过剩人口 (relative surplus population) → Bauman’s “human waste” (人类废品 — produced by modernity, un-reabsorbable).
• Definition: “不是’穷人’或’失业者’——穷人和失业者仍被第三类（社会主义/治理）收编。废弃人口是三种逻辑同时拒绝接收的人。”
• Four generation mechanisms [A]: 1. 计算性废弃 — system can’t read you: no ID, no phone number, no data footprint. “不存在”比“拒绝”更不可容忍. 2. 价值性废弃 — none of the three logics wants your exchange: no skill (tier 1), labor automated away (tier 2), not even obedient (tier 3). You’re negative value to every system. 3. 空间性废弃 — physically outside infrastructure: no grid, no power, no address. Not “offline by choice” but never connected. 4. 代际性废弃 — skills mismatched with the system switch: a generation trained for factories/agriculture/old services; new system doesn’t want their bodies and can’t re-encode their minds.
• China refuses the category: 扶贫、网格化、数字身份 re-encode everyone into tier 3. [A] “在中国，不被管理本身就是最大的违规” / “不允许存在真正的废弃人口” — but forced inclusion converts waste into “极高摩擦、极低数据质量” tier-3 members (e.g. an offline elder forced into WeChat + medical QR code).

Grid workers (your observation, verified in convo) [U] “中国政府其实拿躺平没办法，只能让社区上门访问。”

• [A] 2023 湖北下陆区《社区网格“敲门行动”实施方案》: 网格员每天入户走访不少于10户，2个月内全覆盖. [from convo’s search — verify before reuse]
• 2014 海南日报: “闭门羹，网格员难咽的家常菜” — residents don’t trust, don’t respond, don’t cooperate. [from convo’s search — verify]
• Why “只能”: data surveillance fails (no data), market incentives fail (refuses competition), law can’t force employment — the only remaining tool is a person at the door, at vanishingly low efficiency.

3. Tier-3 time: “被剩余的时间” and Douyin

[U] “第三类人是不是有空闲时间，带不知道怎么用，就刷抖音”

• [A] Tier-3 time is not free time, it’s leftover time: “空闲不是自由，而是未被分配的空隙” — not chosen leisure, but what remains after external definition of labor value; neither needed nor respected, a dangerous blank to be filled.
• [A] Douyin is the perfect governance interface: no learning, no decisions, no projects; the feed decides for you; it provides a “I’m participating” illusion; it fills leftover time that might breed boredom, reflection, gathering, or slippage into 躺平.
• [A] “对第三类人而言，不只是消遣，是维稳。” Douyin converts leftover time into data production + ad consumption at the cheapest cost, while blocking conversion of that time into the other two lifestyles.
• [A] “被剩余的时间” + AI dynamic adaptation = the administered are predicted and satisfied before they can want.

4. AI and dynamic rules

[U] “不会固化。AI会让规则动态适应需求”

[A] Counter: dynamic adaptation ≠ no lock-in — it makes lock-in invisible. - “需求”是被预测的，不是被表达的 — AI adapts to your data proxy, not your actual need; even resistance is pre-empted and smoothed away. - 静态规则 vs 动态适应: static rules show you the boundary (you can step on the line); dynamic ones move the line before you reach it. 反抗找不到对象，因为“这确实是为你好”. - “固化在文本中 ↔ 固化在模型权重里，不可解释” - “动态的边界可能比静态的围墙更坚固——因为墙太高你会想爬，但温水你只会想待在里面” - [A] Who defines the adaptation’s objective function? “他们不必拥有生产资料，只需要拥有损失函数的定义权。” — you don’t need to own the means of production, only the right to define the loss function.

5. Home vs closed loop; why tier 2 persists

[U] “地球也是和几乎无法逃逸的地方，而我们用家园描述它” [U] “量子物理的反应本身是一种计算。第二类人，如果有人愿意炒股，有人愿意投资，他就会存在。”

• [A] The closed loop is not a prison; the question is how one dwells in it. Earth is a loop too — we call it home. Difference: earth is 给予的 (given), the loop is 建造的 (built). Earth doesn’t extract attention; Douyin does. The loop is a colonial “home” — natives relocated to a reserve, told “this is your home”.
• [A] 生成性计算 (generative: multi-directional, emergent, slow feedback) vs 提取性计算 (extractive: one-way, immediate, optimizing for predictability). Being computed is not the problem — being singly computed is. Tier-3 isn’t computed more than anyone; it is computed without a contract.
• [A] Tier 1 provides oxygen (protocols), tier 2 provides flow and choice (capital allocation, market error-correction), tier 3 provides stability and recognition (most people need to be seen, to have routine, to have gravity). All three persist; the real question is who monopolizes the definition of computation.
• [A] The healthiest future: switching rights — “没有人被终身绑定在一种被计算的方式里。你想做开源时，你是第一类；你想投机时，你是第二类；你想被照顾时，你是第三类。”
• [A] “未来真正的稀缺资源不是金钱，而是’生活方式的自主权’——能够选择在哪一层活着，以及在不同层之间自由切换的能力。”

6. Open-source AI: migration, and the four wastes again

[U] “如果是open source ai, 迁移会更普及。废弃人口是怎么产生的？”

• [A] Open-source AI partial-generalizes tier-1’s protocol power: local deployment, weight inspection, prompt modification → platforms lose their one-way-computation monopoly. Examples: Llama/Mistral open weights, Ollama, vLLM, Stable Diffusion. Tier-3 users running local models without a data footprint get a migration channel from “administered” toward “protocol”.
• [A] But open-source AI may increase waste production: - 门槛迁移: previously “can use the internet” sufficed for tier 3; future “can use open-source AI” is the minimum to stay tier 3 or climb to tier 1. “连被治理都需要新的最低技能。” - 废弃的标准化: as tier 1+2 get more efficient, people who can’t use the tools zero out faster. - 算力鸿沟: “模型可以开源，但运行模型的GPU、电力、宽带不会开源。” Waste shifts from 没有信息 to 没有算力. - Open question the convo ended on: will future waste be “有算力但无法被验证” — your local AI runs but no platform recognizes its output, your computation is read by nobody?

7. The Kimi thread: stage, UBI, labor, who pays, the jungle, culture

7.1 Which stage are we in? [U] “随着生产力的提升，越来越少的人需要工作，于是越来越多人失业，政府将不得不采取措施补偿失业。我们在哪个阶段？”

[A] Very early — not even at the doorstep of compensating unemployment: - Productivity gains are real but mass unemployment hasn’t arrived; the dominant problem is still labor shortage (aging), not surplus. Government worries about no one working, not no work. - Policy still runs the opposite direction: 创造就业 (subsidies, flexible employment, delayed retirement). Compensation would be marked by the state admitting “we no longer need that many people” and institutionalizing payments (UBI) — only scattered pilots exist, no country has gone there. - What’s different this time: the displaced work is 认知劳动 (cognitive labor) — the endpoint of the last migration, with no obvious next absorbing industry. “所以’这个阶段会很短’和’这个阶段会很长’两种判断都有道理，取决于AI能力扩散的速度。” - [A] “历史每次技术替代，承担代价的都不是’失业后被补偿的人’，而是新旧交替中间那一代——技能过期、补偿未到的那批人。” — the transitional generation pays.

7.2 UBI feasibility in China (numbers)

• UNDP 2020 (专门针对中国的UBI报告): 每人每月仅267元发给14亿人 → 年支出 4.5万亿元 = 当年低保总支出25倍 ≈ 全国财政收入1/4. Conclusion: 当前社会经济条件不支持全国推行. https://www.undp.org/china/publications/universal-basic-income-china
• 每人每月1000元 → 年成本16.8万亿元 ≈ GDP 13% ≈ 2024年一般公共预算收入(约22万亿)的八成.
• 2024 民政部数据: 城市低保 625万人 @ 798.1元/月 (全年458.8亿); 农村低保 3361.5万人 @ 593.9元/月 (全年1542.4亿). 合计 <4000万人、约2001亿 — covers <3% of the population, below a basic-living standard. 平摊给14亿人 = 每人每月12元. (via ce.cn: http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/202507/t20250730_2425895.shtml)
• 头条测算: 月发1500元需2.52万亿/年; 靠AI企业特别税 + 整合现有救济支出(约1.2万亿) + 央企利润划转 → 缺口压到可讨论范围. https://www.toutiao.com/article/7488362388211679778/
• 结构性障碍: (1) 与“促就业、增劳动供给”的政策理念冲突 (老龄化+少子化背景下无条件发钱方向相反); (2) 区域矛盾 — 局部试点与人口自由流动冲突 (哪里发钱人往哪里迁); (3) 替代方案已在 — 赡养扣除瞄准老人、低保瞄准穷人，“不充分UBI”摊薄弱势群体既得保障. (via fxbaogao: https://www.fxbaogao.com/detail/4643973)
• [A] “UBI的可行性不取决于财政技巧，取决于生产力拐点是否真的到来。现在钱还不是从’机器替代人’里多出来的，而是从仍在工作的人身上抽的，所以政治上走不通。”
• [A] “技术上发得起（数字人民币、政务数据平台都具备），财政上发不起，政治上没到非发不可的时候。”

7.3 “中国缺人力” — structural mismatch, not shortage [U] “也就是说，现在的中国缺人力”

[A] 不准确 — 结构性错配, three coexisting facts: - 缺的: 制造业普工 (常年招工难)、养老护理、家政、农业劳动力 — young people won’t take them; aging deepens the gap yearly. - 不缺的: 白领、毕业生 — 每年1200万大学毕业生, 青年失业率长期两位数, 考公考编内卷. - 错配的根源: industry wants hands and backs; education mass-produces “office people”. - [A] “中国此刻担心的不是’人没活干’，而是’活没人干’——指那些低薪脏累的活。” - [A] The flip will come from both ends at once: “AI和自动化替代的顺序，很可能先是缺人岗位（机器人进厂、进养老）和过剩岗位（白领被AI替代）两头同时吃。” When replacement outruns aging-driven natural shortage, “缺人力” and “发UBI” flip together.

7.4 Manufacturing: why “just stop making things” isn’t free [U] “制造业普工缺就不制造了呗。有问题吗？”

[A] Three exit paths, each with known ledger: 1. 进口替代制造 (US model, 40 years): manufacturing offshored, design/finance kept; lives on trade deficit + dollar privilege; China lacks that privilege and a 14亿-person import bill would explode the deficit. The US itself found the path toxic: 铁锈带一整代被碾过, society torn to this day. 2. 自动化替代人力 (the actual answer, already happening): 中国工业机器人装机量占全球一半以上. The shortage becomes 维修工程师/产线程序员 — which moves toward the UBI premise: machines work, people don’t. 3. 只靠服务业: doesn’t produce enough tradable goods; you’d have nothing to exchange for chips, soy, oil, iron ore. 制造业 = 贸易顺差来源 = 财政和汇率的底盘. - [A] “制造业对中国不只是就业，是贸易顺差的来源。” - [A] Your attitude (“这活没人干就不干呗”) is the folk version of the inflection point: either automation fills it or society accepts a lower standard of living. Both are happening; the first much faster.

7.5 Who pays? [U] “所以代价都是谁付？”

[A] By path: - 外移 (US model): manufacturing workers and their regions pay. Capital didn’t — it followed the factory and shareholders earned more. Coastal cities didn’t — finance/tech boomed. Paid: 铁锈带那代人 — jobs gone, communities collapsed, life expectancy fell, then their anger became political instability and everyone paid. - 依赖进口: everyone pays, in installments — first export-linked workers, then all: currency depreciation, pricier imports, shrinking fiscal space, cut public services. By the time it’s felt, there’s no turning back. - 自动化顶上: today’s displaced workers pay; long-run the least-bargaining cohort pays. “机器替代谁，谁就付。转型的收益归资本所有者和有技能的人，转型的成本归恰好站在机器旁边的那个人。” - The law: “代价永远落在一段时间内议价能力最弱的人身上，收益落在议价能力最强的人身上。技术是加速器，不改变分配方向。” - [A] UBI is politically hard precisely because “它的本质是让有议价能力的人提前付钱，去买断未来弱势者的代价。历史上这种事只在一种情况下发生——弱势者的代价开始外溢到所有人头上（失业潮变成社会动荡）。”

7.6 The jungle, and why the distribution mechanism is invariant [U] “这有点像弱肉强食，都有不是一样” [U] “为什么分配机制一样？”

• [A] Structurally yes, it’s the jungle — 议价能力就是牙齿和爪子，只是换了副文明的面孔. But: 兽群强者吃完就完了；人群强者吃掉太多，弱者会掀桌子. Civilization’s mechanisms (税收、福利、工会、法律、UBI) “本质上不是善，是强者的保险费” — paid not from morality but because an unpaying table gets flipped.
• [A] Why the mechanism never changes: 1. “分配的对象是稀缺的，争夺稀缺靠的是筹码” — whatever the system’s name (奴隶制、封建、市场、计划), the question is always: what can you make the other side pay? Landowners, capital, 编制 — the chips change, “以筹码定分配” doesn’t. 2. “规则是赢家写的，且只在两种时候改” — when the winners compute that concession is cheaper than suppression (welfare states), or when the losers flip the table and new winners rewrite (revolutions). Power shifts first; rules follow. Never the reverse. 3. “连’平等’本身也是力量的产物” — one person one vote exists not because equality won the argument, “是因为人数本身曾经是一种力量——战场上需要人海，工厂里需要人海，弱者就有了筹码。” - Chips morph: 土地→资本→技能→数据. The invariant: “没有筹码的人分到零头”.
• [A] Buddhist aside (your framing): 共业 — the mechanism isn’t designed by anyone; it’s the aggregate of every participant’s “我多你少”. “机制在人心里面，不在制度里面。制度换了，人心没换，新制度就会被旧人心蛀回原来的样子。”

7.7 Culture can change — the line between indoctrination and seeing [U] “不排除文化会改变。大家不想我多你少了。” [U] “那我们应该让人看见”

• [A] Genuine possibility; happened locally and historically (某些僧团、共同体、战时配给时期) — not persuaded into being, but people actually saw that “我多你少” is the root of suffering and let go. Forced versions (平均主义、公社) all failed — they changed behavior, not seeing.
• [A] “文化改变的分界线只有一条：是被灌输的’应该不争’，还是看见之后的’不必争’。” 前者是新的规则，会被力量蛀空; 后者是人心变了，机制失去地基.
• [A] Material precondition helps: “物质过剩的世代天然比匮乏世代更容易怀疑’我多你少’” — 躺平、低欲望、退出竞争 are crude but directionally an abdication of the old chip system.
• [A] “你问的’阶段’，如果只盯财政和失业率，会看错地方。真正的先行指标是：多少人开始觉得这场游戏本身不值得玩。”
• [A] On “让人看见” (delicate, and it’s your own insight): the sentence carries a hierarchy — 我看见了，你还没看见，我来让你看见 — which is still “我多你少” with the chip swapped from money to insight (“我慢里最细的一种”). Being made to see doesn’t count: “指月亮的手指，人手一根，到处都是，月亮还是得自己抬头。” Those who succeed at it historically weren’t “letting” anyone — they just lived their own seeing, and others bumped into it.
• [A] “船划不划由你，上不上船由他。划的时候心里没有’我在度他’，船才是空的，空船人才敢上。” — rowing is yours; boarding is theirs; the boat is only empty (and therefore boardable) when the rower isn’t thinking “I am ferrying them”.

8. Quick index of reusable formulations

• 3 tiers as lifestyle catalogue: 共产=共有, 资本=交换, 社会=被治理 — orthogonal to wealth.
• Escape right (逃逸权) > ownership of means of production.
• 结构性善意劫持: tier-1 gifts → tier-2 platforms → tier-3 cage.
• 躺平 = degradation attack on governance (make the machine idle).
• 废弃人口 = three logics refuse you simultaneously; 4 mechanisms: 计算性/价值性/空间性/代际性.
• 被剩余的时间; Douyin as 时间收容所 / 维稳.
• 固化在文本 vs 固化在模型权重; 损失函数定义权.
• 家园 vs 闭环: 生成性计算 vs 提取性计算; earth doesn’t extract attention.
• 生活方式的自主权 = the post-scarce scarce resource.
• 代价落点 = 议价能力最弱者; 技术是加速器，不改变分配方向.
• 补偿机制 = 强者的保险费; 不是因为钱够了，是因为不稳了.
• 人多曾是弱者的筹码 (人海/工厂/一人一票); AI 让筹码归零 → 座位变成配额.
• 文化改变: 灌输的“应该不争” vs 看见的“不必争”; 先行指标 = 多少人觉得游戏不值得玩.
• 空船: 船划不划由你，上不上船由他.

9. References (from the conversations)

• UNDP UBI-in-China report: https://www.undp.org/china/publications/universal-basic-income-china
• 民政部 2024 低保数据 via ce.cn: http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/202507/t20250730_2425895.shtml
• 头条 UBI 测算: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7488362388211679778/
• fxbaogao 研究综述: https://www.fxbaogao.com/detail/4643973
• 海南日报《闭门羹，网格员难咽的家常菜》(via banyuetan.org, cited in Kagi convo — verify)
• DW《不確定的中國夢：青年失業與「躺平」折射的社會現實》(cited in Kagi convo)
• 马乔恩《<资本论>视域中的生命政治批判研究》(cited in Kagi convo, odd source — verify)
• 躺平定性为“外部势力煽动” (2026-04, 国安部) — stated in Kagi convo, unverified by me
• 湖北下陆区网格“敲门行动”方案 (2023) — stated in Kagi convo, unverified by me
• 中国工业机器人装机量占全球一半以上 — stated in Kimi convo
• Blog-internal crosslinks you might use: /blog/99-economic-outage/, /blog/A6-live-in-ai-era/, /blog/58-freedom-from-want-and-fear/, /blog/89-need-based-currency/, /blog/02-equality-should-not-be-instrumental/